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SUICIDE AS A COMPENSABLE CLAIM UNDER
WORKERS' COMPENSATION STATUTES: A GUIDE FOR
THE LAWYER AND THE PSYCHIATRIST
JOHN BATT*
CHRISTOPHER P. BASTIEN**
We live in a highly complex, industrialized environment.' Specific work-
related events occurring within this context frequently impact negatively on
those who are essential to the operation of our industrial system.2 Often the
impact of events produces human misery, suffering and death. Men and
women are injured, maimed and killed. Workers' compensation statutes exist
to ameliorate the plight of workers and their families' through the utilization
of compensation in the form of cash-wage benefits and medical care.' The
economic burden of compensation is ultimately borne by consumers,5 because
the cost of insurance taken out by employers is passed on in the price of the
goods and services produced.6
Both workers' compensation statutes and the systems produced by those
statutes are appropriate responses to the perceived needs of all who have an
interest in a productive economy and a just social order. As in any decision-
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; B.A., Johns Hopkins University, 1956; LL.B.,
William & Mary Law School, 1959; LL.M., Yale University, 1960; Member, Association for Ap-
plied Psychoanalysis.
** B.A., Centre College of Kentucky, 1980; J.D., University of Kentucky, 1983; Associate,
Steptoe & Johnson, Clarksburg, W.Va. ; Member, West Virginia Bar.
' Attorneys, judges, legislators, psychiatrists, psychologists and academicians need to be
aware of the literature critical in the analysis of this problem. Successful practical and theoretical
work depends upon access to quality information. The authors have attempted herein to provide
both the practitioner and the expert with a core of relevant information which would well serve
those who, of necessity or out of academic interest, concern themselves with the suicide pheno-
menon occurring within the decision-making realm of workers' compensation systems.
' See generally 1 A. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.10, at 1-1 (1983) [herein-
after cited as LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION].
3 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. King, 434 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 444 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1969) (workers' compensation act should be liberally construed be-
cause of its inherent humanitarian purposes); see also ISSUES CONFRONTING THE 1980 KENTUCKY
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 129-34 (1974) (superseded by the LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COIMISSION-
BULLETIN No. 131).
LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 2, § 1.10, at 1-1.
See Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 616, 631 (1967), wherein it is stated that:
[T]he general socioeconomic purpose of the workmen's compensation statutes ... is to
provide financial and medical benefits to the victims of "work-connected" injuries and
their families-regardless of fault-which any enlightened community would feel obli-
gated to prove in any case, and to allocate the financial burden to the most appropriate
source, the employer, and, ultimately, the consumer of the product.
See also Case Comment, Workmen's Compensation: Suicide Resulting From Mental Disorder
Caused by Work-Connected Injury Held Compensable, 1962 DUKE L.J. 618, 622 n.24 (1962) [herein-
after cited as Duke Comment]. See generally Casenote, Compensability of Suicide of Mentally Ill
Employee, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV., 673, 674 (1961).
LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 2, § 1.00, at 1-1.
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making system designed to deal with complex cases, however, there exist op-
portunities for disagreement concerning the legal disposition of certain cases.
This article deals with one of those matters which is subject to such serious
debate: When should suicide,7 following a trauma experienced within the job
context, give rise to a compensable claim under workers' compensation stat-
utes? Although there has been prior general commentary on the problem,'
this article will offer some additional and perhaps useful information to both
the attorney representing the claimant and the psychiatrist called to testify
as an expert witness.
' A rather unsophisticated definition of suicide is "the act or an instance of taking one's own
life voluntarily and intentionally." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2286 (1976).
Suicide has also been inappropriately characterized as an act which is committed by a person
"who is able to weigh and appreciate the results of the contemplated deed." Note, Suicide Under
Workmen's Compensation Laws, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 26 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Clev. -Mar. Note]; Hepner v. Department of Labor and Indus., 141 Wash. 55, 250 P. 461 (1926).
Suicide is a phenomenon which recently has begun to receive the attention it deserves. P.
DOLAN, M.D. & D. ROCKWELL, M.D., PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS: DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 294
(1982). One percent of all deaths are recorded as resulting from suicide; however, researchers are
certain that the true figure is much higher. Id. Modern psychiatric data has revealed that, in
truth, there is a suicide "iceberg." An analysis of the "iceberg" confirms that above the
hypothetical water line there are at least 25,000 deaths which take place by suicide each year. Id.
at 295. Below the hypothetical water line one discovers approximately 250,000 attempts, 2,500,000
threats, and 25,000,000 instances of suicidal idealations or suicidal gesturing. Id. Thus, it becomes
readily discernible that this "phenomenon" has the actual and potential capacity to affect
negatively over 100,000,000 associated family members each year. Id. at 295. It is indisputable
that human beings are suicide vulnerable. To deny the inherent vulnerability which exists in each
and every one of us is to avoid our responsibility to ourselves and to society.
It is well-established that psychological damage can be produced by on-the-job trauma.
Various psychological states, most notably depression, resulting from on-the-job trauma, and the
drugs prescribed after job-related trauma, are both factors creating a special risk of suicide. Id. at
296-300.
It is unquestionable that the physical and psychic pain following work-related trauma can be
so disturbing to one's psychic homeostasis that the injured worker is persuaded to commit suicide.
Id. at 179. See MORGAN, PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 357 (1943). Although the authors possess no
exact data, a review of the workers' compensation literature makes it clear that there are a sub-
stantial number of suicides which are the product of work-related trauma.
The psychiatric reality is that in almost all cases suicide is a self-destructive act manifesting
an extreme degree of personality dysfunction. Suicides antedated by bodily or another type of
trauma are in the great majority of cases the product of the dysfunctional self's effort to overcome
disabling pain, the impotence of helplessness and the nauseating despair of an existence devoid of
hope. See, e.g., A. BECK, DEPRESSION (1976); M. BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE
OF LAW (2d ed. 1982); N. FARBEROW & E. SCHNEIDMAN, THE CRY FOR HELP (1965); R. FIEVE, MOOD-
SWING (1976); P. GIOVACCHINI, THE URGE TO DIE (1983); H. HENDIN, BLACK SUICIDE (1971); J.
HILLMAN, SUICIDE AND THE SOUL (1964); L. KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (1977); R. LIFTON,
THE BROKEN CONNECTION (1979); A. LUDWIG, PRINCIPLES OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (1980); K. MENN-
INGER, MAN AGAINST HIMSELF (1938); E. SCHNEIDMAN, SUICIDOLOGY: CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS
(1976); E. SCHNEIDMAN, DEATHS OF MAN (1974).
" At least two other extensive discussions of the suicide phenomenon in the area of workers'
compensation law have been published. See Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 616 (1967); LARSON'S WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION, supr note 2, § 36.
[Vol. 86
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A working comprehension of the psychiatric aspects of suicide is
necessary in order to prepare and prosecute a successful claim or to organize
a defense in this area of the law. Additionally, the expert, even if carefully
selected, must understand the legal framework in which his or her testimony
will be interpreted. Unquestionably, a working relationship between the at-
torney and the psychiatrist is a necessity in terms of preparation. Many prac-
titioners, however, may initially fail to realize that the early decisions recogn-
izing suicide as a compensable workers' compensation claim erroneously
focus upon knowledge, cognition and uncontrollable impulses. Since the ar-
ticulated models utilized by these courts in the earlier cases have become en-
trenched in some jurisdictions and in the minds of many judicial decision-
makers, the psychiatric expert will often be forced to apply modern theories
of psychiatry to illegitimately unscientific modes of legal analysis. These fac-
tors become increasingly important since many courts, when confronted with
the generally liberal application of workers' compensation statutes 9 and the
advent of modern scientific insights into the causes of suicide,"0 have been
forced to consider the issue of whether an employee's suicide which follows a
compensable on-the-job injury should constitute a separate ground for
workers' compensation benefits.
The theory behind successful claims of this nature has been that an em-
ployee who has suffered a compensable injury, which in turn triggers a psy-
chiatric disorder resulting in suicide, is entitled to both an inter vivos com-
pensation award and a death benefit. It is clear, however, that since suicide is
generally defined as an "intentional" act (without regard to whether or not
suicide is psychiatrically considered volitional or nonvolitional), many juris-
dictions would deny workers' compensation death benefits to employees who
take their own lives." Classic concepts indicate that recovery should be
I See, e.g., Saunders v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 526 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. 1975); Case Com-
ment, Workmen's Compensation-Suicide Which Results from an Irresistible Impulse Caused by
a Work-Connected Injury Is Compensable Under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, 7 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 810, 812 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Texas Tech Comment].
" See supra note 7. See also Avery v. City of Middletown, 40 A.D.2d 568, 334 N.Y.S.2d 708
(App. Div. 1972), rev'd, 33 N.Y.2d 771, 350 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1973) (adopting lower court's dissent);
Reinstein v. Mendola, 39 A.D.2d 369, 334 N.Y.S.2d 488 (App. Div. 1972), affd, 33 N.Y.2d 589, 301
N.E.2d 438, 347 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1973); MORGAN, PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 357 (1943); Berger,
Drugs and Suicide in the United States, 8 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 219 (1967).
In a recent decision, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals noted that "mental dis-
orders, such as [a] manic depressive condition .... can operate 'to break down rational mental pro-
cesses, placing the person afflicted in a mental state in which death actually seems more attrac-
tive than living, and in which he may not only have a conscious volition to produce death, but be
eager to do so."' Hall v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 303 S.E.2d 726, 730 (W. Va.
1983) (quoting Burnight v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 826, 5 Cal. Rptr. 786,
793 (1960)).
" For example, W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (Supp. 1983) provides, in part:
[N]o employee or dependent of any employee shall be entitled to receive any sum from
the workmen's compensation fund ... on account of any personal injury to or death to
1984]
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granted, if at all, only when there has been a "work related harmful change in
the human organism, arising out of and in the course of employment ... '"'
Nevertheless, when a direct causal relationship can be established among a
work-related injury, a psychiatric disorder, and subsequent suicide, tradi-
tional notions should be updated and expanded to permit death benefit
awards.
Courts, when confronted with this dilemma, have utilized four different
types of analyses. These modes of analysis can properly be identified as the
Sponatski test,"3 the New York rule,14 the English rule15 and the chain of
any employee caused by a self-inflicted injury, or the intoxication of such employee.
A vast majority of states have a statutory bar similar to West Virginia's and interpret "self-
inflicted" to mean intentional. Thus, those courts which embrace anacronistic definitions of suicide
refuse to allow recovery for any suicide, even when a mental disease or illness created by an on-
the-job injury precipitates the suicidal act and removes the element of intent from the mind of the
actor. See supra note 7 for discussion of representative definitions of suicide. For example, KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. 342.610(3) (Baldwin 1982) states "[1liability for compensation shall not apply
where injury, occupational disease, or death to the employee was proximately caused primarily by
his intoxication or by his willful intention to injure or kill himself or another." (emphasis added).
The federal counterparts to these defenses are found in the Employees' Compensation Act, 5
U.S.C. § 8102(a)(2) (1976) and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33
U.S.C. § 903(b) (1976). The states whose workmen's compensation statutes "make no specific
reference to suicide or intentional self-injury are those of Connecticut, Illinois, Michigan, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Wyoming." LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 2, §
36.10, at 6-117 n.2.
12 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.620(1) (Baldwin 1982). Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.005, repealed
by Act of March 17, 1972, ch. 78, § 20, 1972 Ky. Acts 305, 349, limited recovery to those claims
which were "traumatic, sustained by accident and [arose] out of and in the course of employment."
Seventh St. Rd. Tobacco Warehouse v. Stillwell, 550 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Ky. 1976). The effect of the
change "was to expand workmen's compensation coverage to nontraumatic injuries." Id.
1" See infra notes 17-58 and accompanying text for discussion of the Sponatski test.
" See infra note 71 for a discussion of the New York rule.
5 Research reveals that no American jurisdictions follow the English rule, therefore, it does
not merit extensive textual treatment. The English rule is somewhat similar to the New York rule
in that it requires that the psychiatric disorder which precipitates the suicidal act be the direct
result of the compensable injury, rather than an indirect result caused by brooding, melancholia
or depression. However, the English rule is a bastardized remnant of what is totally unsuppor-
table by modern psychiatric data.
The English rule represents a mode of analysis which ignores both the far-reaching effects
which pain, depression and melancholia can have on the mind as well as the humanitarian policies
which workers' compensation statutes were designed to promote. See, e.g., LARSON'S WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION, supra note 2, § 2.20 and authorities cited at supra note 3. The English courts
which have been confronted with this issue have viewed "[i]nsanity as a question of degree" and
have explained their analysis in the following manner:
You depart from the ordinary statement of sanity of your time, and it may be that that
physical change in the first place that takes place from the shock of the accident may
take you so far from the normal standard of sanity that you would be considered insane.
And if then the suicide results from that condition of mind you may have a case where
the accident has caused the suicide. On the other hand you may have a case where the
accident has created some physical disability which causes great pain and continuing
[Vol. 86
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causation test.16 This article examines the evolution of judicial understanding
of suicide as related to the workers' compensation system, endorses the lib-
eral chain of causation test, and demonstrates that the chain of causation
approach most closely corresponds with modern psychiatric theory.
I. THE SPONATSKI TEST
The test historically utilized by a majority of jurisdictions confronting
pain after the accident which engenders great apprehension of poverty, and a mind
which was sound at the time of the accident and after the accident may continue think-
ing about this fear of pain in the future, or this fear of poverty, and brood over it, and
gradually get into such a morbid condition that from the result of that brooding you
commit suicide, and the line between the two is not easy to draw. Obviously there will
be a state of things which is half-way between the two. But, in my view, if you get the
first state of facts you get a case where the suicide does result from the accident. If you
get the second state of facts you get a state of facts where the suicide is too remote from
the accident to be considered the cause of it.
Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 616, 636 (1967) (quoting Marriott v. Maltby Main Colliery, [1920] All E.R. 193,
124 L.T.R. (n.s.) 489, 90 L.J.K.B. (n.s.) 489 (Eng. C.A.)).
An overview of the results obtained in many of the English cases reveals the fallacious
reasoning which has been employed in their decisions. For instance, compensation was allowed in
the following cases: In Marriott v. Maltby Main Colliery Co., [1920] All E.R. 193, 123 L.T.R. (n.s.)
489, 90 L.J.K.B. (n.s.) 489 (Eng. C.A.). a mine roof prop was knocked away from and created the
possibility that a cave-in would occur. The prop fell upon a mine worker's hand causing him
serious injury and extreme fright. After the accident he became very depressed and three months
later cut his throat with a razor. Compensation was allowed based upon a holding that the shock
of the accident caused the insanity to develop. See also Fanning v. Richard Evans & Co., 16
B.W.C.C. 43 (Eng. 1923) (compensation allowed based upon a direct chain of causation between a
miner's nystagmus, his subsequent development of psychosis and eventual suicide); Dixon v. Sut-
ton Heath & Lea Green Colliery, Ltd., 23 B.W.C.C. 135 (Eng. C.A. 1930) (compensation allowed
after suicide by drowning based upon direct causal link between nystagmus and the subsequent
suicide).
Compensation has been denied in a number of cases because English courts concluded that
the suicide was the result of the injured workers' brooding after the accident, thereby theoretical-
ly (and fallaciously) breaking the chain of causation: See, e.g., Grime v. Fletcher, [1915] 1 K.B. 734
(Eng. C.A.) (decedent suffered eye injury and attempted to continue work even though his physi-
cian advised him that he would have to stop working or lose his sight; in a fit of depression the
worker committed suicide); Withers v. London, B. & S.C. Railway Co., [1916] 2 K.B. 772 (Eng. C.A.)
(thumb injury prevented worker from continuing work, causing depression, delusion of permanent
incapacity and ending in suicide four months later); Brown v. Kingsbury Collieries, Ltd., [1921] 14
B.W.C.C. 244 (Eng. C.A.) (benefits denied based upon the court's characterization of the original
injury as intentionally self-inflicted); Bevan v. Lancasters Steam Coal Collieries, [19271 20 B.W.C.C.
241 (Eng. C.A.) (denial based upon what the court characterized as a "rational" suicide note);
Johnson v. F. Warren & Co., [1928] 21 B.W.C.C. 411 (Eng. C.A.) (where a worker crushed by horse
and cut his throat two years later compensation was denied based upon brooding of injured
worker); Bradshaw v. Bickerstaffe Collieries, [1931] 24 B.W.C.C. 451 (Eng. C.A.) (when miner's
nystagmus resulted in severe depression and he subsequently committed suicide by slitting his
throat and drowning benefits were denied based upon court's finding that there was no evidence
of disordered conduct or delusions).
" See infra notes 59-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the chain of causation test.
1984]
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this issue 17 was first enunciated by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in In re
" The Sponatski test has been recognized in Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin. See, e.g.,
Schofield v. White, 250 Iowa 571, 95 N.W.2d 40 (1959) (benefits granted based on findings of a
causal connection between suicide and brain injury resulting from accident that arose in the
course of employment, but Sponatski principles recited); Ruschetti's Case, 299 Mass. 426, 13
N.E.2d 34 (1938) (work-related injury resulting in arm amputation; suicide by hanging; benefits
denied even though expert testimony established that decedent was insane); Tetrault's Case, 278
Mass. 447, 180 N.E. 231 (1932) (benefits denied because decedent waved "goodbye" before he
jumped from a bridge, which the court felt showed the absence of an uncontrollable impulse);
Lehman v. A. V. Winterer Co., 272 Minn. 79, 136 N.W.2d 649 (1965) (suicide three and one-half
years after the original injury, benefits denied under Sponatski because the resulting mental
disease was considered too remote and speculative); Anderson v. Armour & Co., 257 Minn. 281,
101 N.W.2d 435 (1960) (benefits allowed, decedent slashed his wrists then plunged knife into his
heart); Mershon v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Corp., 359 Mo. 257, 221 S.W.2d 165 (1949) (unclear expert
testimony on causation issue; work injury not proven; benefits denied; Sponatski type analysis
recited); Konazewska v. Erie R.R., 132 N.J.L. 424, 41 A.2d 130 (1945), aff'd, 133 N.J.L. 557, 45 A.2d
315 (1946), overruled sub nom. Kahler v. Plochman, 85 N.J. 539, 428 A.2d 913 (1981) (suicide by
hanging, benefits denied, no uncontrollable impulse); Kazazian v. Segan, 14 N.J. Misc. 78, 182 A.
351 (1936) (Sponatski quoted; benefits denied because of decedent's meticulous preparation before
committing suicide by hanging); Industrial Comm'n. v. Brubaker, 129 Ohio St. 617, 196 N.E. 409
(1935) (benefits denied, no uncontrollable impulse); Speece v. Industrial Comm'n, 46 Ohio L. Abs.
453, 70 N.E.2d 387 (1945) (work injury from exposure to severe cold; suicide; Sponatski test cited,
benefits granted); Jones v. Cascade Wood Products, 21 Or. App. 86, 533 P.2d 1399 (1975); Gasperin
v. Consolidated Coal Co., 293 Pa. 589, 143 A. 187 (1928); Lupfer v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 269
Pa. 275, 112 A. 458 (1921) (electric shock; intense pain; suicide benefits awarded); Zimmiski v.
Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 200 Pa. Super. 524, 189 A.2d 897 (1963) (anthracosilicosis, neither causal
connection nor irrational impulse proven; benefits denied); Blasczak v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 193
Pa. Super. 422, 165 A.2d 128 (1960) (foot injury; amputation; hanging; benefits awarded); Widdis v.
Collingdale Millwork Co., 169 Pa. Super. 612, 84 A.2d 259 (1951) (anthracosilicosis, benefits denied);
Vadnal v. Krsul-Kutchel Coal Co., 149 Pa. Super. 269, 27 A.2d 709 (1942) (hanging, uncontrollable
impulse, benefits awarded); Kasman v. Hillman Coal & Coke Co., 149 Pa. Super. 263, 27 A.2d 762
(1942) (back injury, intentional suicide, benefits denied); Cubit v. Philadelphia, 138 Pa. Super. 325,
10 A.2d 853 (1940) (cerebral concussion, suicide six months later; causal connection and involun-
tary behavior unclear; remanded); University of Pittsburgh v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 49
Pa. Commw. 347, 405 A.2d 1048 (1979) (doctor suffering extreme stress; received leave of absence
with pay, committed suicide; benefits awarded); Jones v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 144 S.W.2d
689 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), aff'd, 140 Tex. 599, 169 S.W.2d 160 (1941) (foot injury; multiple infec-
tions; suicide by poisoning); McKane v. Capital Hill Quarry Co., 100 Vt. 45, 134 A. 640 (1926)
(benefits denied when suicide is the result of a voluntary, willful choice, with knowledge of the
purpose and physical effect of the act); Mercer v. Department of Labor & Indus., 74 Wash. 2d 96,
442 P.2d 1000 (1968) (serious hand injury to logger, benefits denied where medical evidence did not
establish suicide committed while acting under an uncontrollable impulse or while in a delirium);
Karlen v. Department of Labor & Indus., 41 Wash. 2d 301, 249 P.2d 364 (1952) (head injury; manic
depressive psychosis; suicide by thrusting head into power saw); McFarland v. Department of
Labor & Indus., 188 Wash. 357, 62 P.2d 714 (1936) (eg fracture; phlebitis; hanging; benefits
granted); Gatterdam v. Department of Labor & Indus., 185 Wash. 628, 56 P.2d 693 (1936) (foot in-jury; osteomyelitis; amputations; suicide; benefits awarded); Barber v. Industrial Comm'n., 241
Wis. 462, 6 N.W.2d 199 (1942) (injury resulted in sexual impotence; suicide by shooting; benefits
granted). Many of these jurisdictions have now abandoned the Sponatski test in favor of the chain
of causation analysis. See, e.g., Oberlander's Case, 348 Mass. 1, 200 N.E.2d 268 (1964); Lambert's
(Dependent's) Case, 364 Mass. 832, 304 N.W.2d 428 (1973) (back injury); psychosis; compensation
6
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Sponatski.'8 In Sponatski, hot molten lead splashed into an employee's eye on
September 17, 1913. Mr. Sponatski lost his sight in that eye and, after a short
hospitalization, he jumped through a hospital window to his death on October
13, 1913.'1 The Massachusetts Industrial Accident Board stated its findings in
this manner:
We find and decide as a fact that the accident injured the eyesight of the de-
ceased, caused the loss of his eye, caused a nervous and mental derangement,
caused insane hallucinations and caused him, while mentally deranged, in a
state of insanity and under the influence of hallucination, by an irresistible im-
pulse, to commit suicide, and that the accident was the sole, direct and proxi-
mate cause of the suicide.'
The Board's findings were clearly supported by the medical evidence con-
tained in the record but the decision to award compensation was appealed.
Due to the progressive orientation of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, the
Board ruling was affirmed. Consequently, suicide was first judicially recogn-
ized in the United States as a valid basis for recovery in workers' compensa-
tion cases.2 '
The rule formulated by the Sponatski court was enunciated by Chief
Judge Rugg:
awarded); Kabler v. Plochman, Inc., 85 N.J. 539, 428 A.2d 913 (1981) (severe back injury; pain
medication; two suicide notes; compensation allowed); Kievsky v. United Neon Supply Corp., 21
N.J. Misc. 43, 30 A.2d 40 (1942) (severe acid burns; manic depressive psychosis; compensation
allowed); Saunders v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 526 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. 1975) (serious back and
leg injury, benefits awarded where effects of injuries suffered by employee resulted in derange-
ment and an uncontrollable impulse or delirium of frenzy causing an inability to resist the desire
to commit suicide); Brenne v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 38 Wis.2d 84, 156
N.W.2d 497 (1968) (circuit court must consider whether decedent, who received a severe electric
shock and committed suicide approximately seven years later sustained a permanent psychic
disability as a result of the injury).
Today the Sponatski rule is followed only in Iowa, Missouri, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont,
Washington, Ohio and Pennsylvania. The latter three jurisdictions have modified the Sponatski
test in one way or another, but have not yet rejected this outdated mode of analysis in favor of the
chain of causation test. See Burnett v. Industrial Comm'n, 87 Ohio App. 441, 93 N.E.2d 41 (1949);
Commonwealth v. Makar, 53 Pa. Commw. 83, 416 A.2d 1155 (1980); Schwab v. Dept. of Labor & In-
dus., 76 Wash.2d 784, 459 P.2d 1 (1969). Minnesota abolished suicide as a compensable workers'
compensation claim by statute in 1967 by amending its statute to include the assertion: "suicides
are not compensable." However, that language was deleted by the Minnesota legislature in 1973.
See MINN. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.021 (West Cum. Supp. 1983). See also Schwartz v. Talmo, 295
Minn. 356, 205 N.W.2d 318, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 803 (1973). Indiana allowed recovery in at
least one case, but failed to select either the Sponatski test or the chain of causation test. See
Jackson Hill Coal & Coke Co. v. Slover, 102 Ind. App. 145, 199 N.E. 417 (1936) (severe burns, dece-
dent shot himself thirty-seven times, compensation granted).
lB 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466 (1915).
Id. at 529, 108 N.E. at 467.
'Id.
21 See LARSON'S WORKaMN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 2, § 36.20, at 6-119.
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[W]here there follows as the direct result of a physical injury an insanity of
such violence as to cause the victim to take his own life through an uncontroll-
able impulse or in a delirium of frenzy, "without conscious volition to produce
death, having knowledge of the physical consequences of the act," then there
is a direct and unbroken causal connection between the physical injury and the
death. But where the resulting insanity is such as to cause suicide through a
voluntary willful choice determined by a moderately intelligent mental power
which knows the-purpose and physical effect of the suicidal act even though
choice is dominated and ruled by a disordered mind, then there is a new and
independent agency which breaks the chain of causation arising from the in-
jury.,
The Sponatski court adopted a traditional proximate cause analysis and
allowed recovery on the facts before it." Many courts which have attempted
' 220 Mass. at 530, 108 N.E. at 468 (emphasis added). The Sponatski court adopted this rule
from its earlier decision of Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424
(1903). In Daniels, the court applied this very same rule to determine whether or not recovery
would be allowed when the wrongful act of a tort-feasor led to the injured party's subsequent
suicide. Id. at 399-400, 67 N.E. at 627. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 (1977); the
following language is pertinent:
If the actor's negligent conduct so brings about the delirium or insanity of another as to
make the actor liable for it, the actor is also liable for harm done by the other to himself
while delirious or insane, if his delirium or insanity
(a) prevents him from realizing the nature of his act and the certainty or risk of
harm involved therein, or
(b) makes it impossible for him to resist an impulse caused by his insanity which
deprives him of his capacity to govern his conduct in accordance with reason.
The illustration following this section demonstrates its application by describing these cir-
cumstances:
A negligently injures B. The injuries cause insanity which takes the form of
suicidal mania- While suffering in this condition, B locks his door to prevent interference
and cuts his throat with a knife which he has secreted and sharpened for that purpose.
A's negligence is the legal cause of B's death or other harm resulting from his cutting
his throat.
Id. at illustration 3.
The application of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 supports the conclusion that suicide
should be compensable in the workers' compensation setting. Nonetheless, the underlying humani-
tarian purposes of workers' compensation statutes make it clear that tort conceptualizations are
not applicable per se. Since workers' compensation statutes seek to impose liability in a more
liberal manner, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 goes far beyond the principles
necessary for judicial recognition of suicide as a valid workers' compensation injury when the act
is preceded by a compensable injury.
I The Sponatski court adopted a tort analysis to allow compensation on the facts presented.
See supra note 22 for a discussion of the tort principles underlying the Sponatski court's analysis.
However, it is important to realize that tort law focuses upon "forseeability" and workers'
compensation statutes focus upon "work-connectedness." LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION,
supra note 2, § 2.20, at 5. The authors herein advocate the usage and adoption of a "but for" test of
causation applied in connection with the chain of causation analysis. See infra note 71 for further
discussion of the "but for" analysis in workers' compensation cases and see infra notes 59-92 and
the accompanying text for a discussion of the chain of causation test and its application. See also
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to apply the Sponatski test have failed to recognize that the test embodies
more than a single concept. The first component is frequently labelled the
"uncontrollable impulse" factor,24 and the second component has been termed
the "knowledge of the physical consequences" factor." The "uncontrollable
impulse" factor deals with the employee's mental capacity to commit a voli-
tional act of suicide, while the "knowledge of the physical consequences" fac-
tor focuses on the employee's ability to appreciate the nature and purpose of
the suicidal act.
A. Uncontrollable Impulse
The inclusion of the "uncontrollable impulse" factor in the Sponatski test
was an attempt to identify a legally cognizable mental disease in the context
of a post-compensable injury suicide.2 8 Despite this laudable intention, the
strict application of the "uncontrollable impulse" test effectively distorted
the judicial focus in workers' compensation suicide cases.
Causation is the central issue in determining whether the employee's sui-
cide is a compensable injury.' The Sponatski court was unwilling to allow
compensation without emphasizing the stringent burden which would be
placed upon any individual who attempted to demonstrate a direct line of
causation among an original injury, a diseased mental state and a suicide.
Nevertheless, many courts, in their applications of the Sponatski test, have
failed to recognize that the "uncontrollable impulse" component is merely
another way of emphasizing the claimant's burden of proving a causal link be-
tween the injury and the suicide.' Some of these misguided courts have
claimed to require "objective" evidence of the existing mental illness, but
Comment, Workmen's Compensation-Insanity as Causal Link Between Injury and Suicide, 45
IOWA L. REv. 669 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Iowa Comment].
"' 220 Mass. at 520, 108 N.E. at 468. See Larson, The Suicide Defense in Workmen's Compen-
sation, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 43, 46 (1973-74) [hereinafter cited as Larson, Suicide Defense]; Texas
Tech Comment4 supra note 9, at 811.
1 220 Mass. at 520, 108 N.E. at 468. See Larson, Suicide Defense, supra note 24, at 46; Texas
Tech Comment4 supra note 9, at 811; see also LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 2, §
36.30, at 6-54.
220 Mass. at 526, 180 N.E. at 466.
See generally Larson, Suicide Defense, supra note 24, at 43; Iowa Comment, supra note 23,
at 673.
" See, e.g., Tetrault's Case, 278 Mass. 447, 180 N.E. 231 (1932) (compensation denied because
employee stopped and said good-bye before jumping from a bridge to his death); Industrial
Comm'n of Ohio v. Brubaker, 129 Ohio St. 617, 196 N.E. 409 (1935) (employee sustained hip injury;
depression and financial difficulties set in; decedent waited until family was gone to church before
shooting himself-recovery denied); Kasman v. Hillman Coal & Coke Co., 149 Pa. Super. 263, 27
A.2d 762 (1942) (recovery denied because injured employee was seen talking to neighbors shortly
before going into a cornfield and shooting himself); Cubit v. Philadelphia, 138 Pa. Super. 325, 10
A.2d 853 (1940) (recovery denied even though worker who had suffered a severe concussion beat
his head against a wall and then shot himself).
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then have awarded benefits only when the employee supposedly demon-
strated his or her mental illness by selecting a creative method of self-anni-
hilation.1 Thus, courts have awarded benefits when the employee has com-
mitted suicide by starvation,"0 by running a knife through his neck 1 or by
slashing his wrists and immediately plunging the knife directly into his
heart.2 Those claimants who select a less bizarre method of suicide are less
likely to recover."
Although this may arguably be a logical application of the "uncon-
trollable impulse" portion of the Sponatski test, it ignores the less spec-
tacular, but no less real, intrinsic pain which is often at the root of demented
and irrational acts of suicide.' Judicial misinterpretation of the "uncon-
trollable impulse" test is readily observable, because a number of decisions
have been rendered by courts claiming to apply the Sponatski analysis, but
denying compensation awards even after finding that the decedent was
"thoroughly demented and deranged [at the time of the suicidal act] as a
result of his [original compensable] injury."'
The deficiency of a standard which hinges upon evidence of mental ill-
ness, but which fails to consider subjective evidence of pain, is self-evident."
" See Karlen v. Department of Labor & Indus., 41 Wash.2d 301, 249 P.2d 364 (1952). In Kar-
len, the decedent suffered a severe hand injury, was subsequently confined in a mental hospital
with severe depression and committed suicide by placing his head directly into a moving power
saw. Id. at 365.
See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text for examples of creative methods of self-annihi-
lation. See also Sinclair's Case, 248 Mass. 414, 143 N.E. 330 (1924) (suicide by starvation following
a back injury); Olson v. F.I. Crane Lumber Co., 259 Minn. 248, 107 N.W.2d 223 (1960) (suicide by
strangulation); Gasperin v. Consolidated Coal Co., 293 Pa. 589, 143 A. 187 (1928) (suicide by jump-
ing from a sixth story hospital window). See generally Larson, Suicide Defense, supra note 24, at
59.
Sinclair's Case, 248 Mass. 414, 143 N.E. 330 (1924).
31 Kelly v. Sugarman, 5 A.D.2d 1023, 173 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1958).
Anderson v. Armour & Co., 257 Minn. 281, 101 N.W.2d 435 (1960).
See Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 616, 645 (1967). See generally Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 97 Ariz. 256, 399 P.2d 664 (1965); Harper v. Industrial Comm'n, 24 fll.2d 103, 180
N.E.2d 480 (1962).
-' See Duke Comment, supra note 5, at 620. See also C. MORGAN, PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
357 (1943) for an excellent discussion on pain's ability to affect normal thought processes.
I See supra notes 28-33 and the accompanying text for examples of this judicial misinterpret-
ation.
See HOROVITZ, WORKMIEN'S COMPENSATION 134 (1944); 4 N.A.C.C.A. (A.T.L.A.) L.J. 19, 44
(1949). See generally A. BECK, DEPRESSION (1976); M. BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRAC-
TICE OF LAw (2d ed. 1982); N. FARBEROW & E. SCHNEIDMAN, THE CRY FOR HELP (1965); R. FIEVE,
MOODSWING (1976); P. GIOVACCHINI, THE URGE TO DIE (1983); H. HENDIN, BLACK SUICIDE (1971); J.
HILLMAN, SUICIDE AND THE SOUL (1964); L. KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (1977); R. LIFTON,
THE BROKEN CONNECTION (1979); A. LUDWIG, PRINCIPLES OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (1980); K. MENN-
INGER, MAN AGAINST HIMSELF (1938); MORGAN, PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1943); E. SCHNEIDMAN,
SUICIDOLOGY: CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS (1976); E. SCHNEIDMAN, DEATHS OF MAN (1974);
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Pain can have far-reaching effects upon both the employee's mental stability
and mental stamina 7 and should therefore be of prime importance in making
judicial determinations about the cause of the suicidal act. When an individ-
ual is dominated by draconian levels of pain, clearly the "calm of death [is
often] the sole concern [of the individual] and ... resistance to a suicidal im-
pulse is impossible."'
B. Knowledge of the Consequences
The second part of the Sponatski test is commonly identified as the
knowledge of the consequences factor, and was explained by the Massachu-
setts court in the following manner:
[W]here the resulting insanity is such as to cause suicide through a voluntary
willful choice determined by a moderately intelligent mental power which
knows the purpose and the effect of the suicidal act even though choice is dom-
inated and ruled by a disordered mind, then there is a new and independent
agency which breaks the chain of causation arising from the injury.9
This portion of the Sponatski test is essentially an analogue of the
M'Naghten rule of criminal responsibility. The application of the M'Naghten
rule in criminal law cases serves to rule out responsibility when the accused
commits a crime while suffering from a mental illness if he is unable to know
the "nature and consequences" of his actions or in the alternative does not
"know" right from wrong." Yet the grafting of the M'Naghten rule onto
workers' compensation jurisprudence by the Sponatski court was clearly un-
warranted." In criminal law, ultimate determinations of guilt or nonguilt are
made by focusing upon the legal elements of responsibility. The four basic
See, e.g., Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-legal Conflicts in the Concept of
Causation, 31 TEx. L. REv. 630 (1953); Duke Comment, supra note 5, at 620; Iowa Comment, supra
note 23, at 670.
1 Recent cases, Workmen's Compensation-Suicide Compensable Where Causal Connection
To Injury, 31 U. CiN. L. REv. 187, 194 (1962).
220 Mass. at 530, 108 N.E. at 468.
" The M'Naghten rule is originally derived from the early English decision in M'Naghten's
Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). In M'Naghten, the defendant shot and killed Edward Drum-
mond, private secretary to Sir Robert Peel. However, his intention, which had been formed by an
insane delusion, was to kill Peel whom he believed to be heading a conspiracy against him. At trial
M'Naghten was held not guilty by reason of insanity. Id. See, e.g., Zimmiski v. Lehigh Valley Coal
Co., 200 Pa. Super. 524, 530, 189 A.2d 897, 900 (1963) (Flood, J., dissenting); Larson, Suicide
Defense, supra note 24, at 47. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIINAL LAW 958-60 (1982). This
treatise provides an excellent discussion of the criminal law application of M'Naghten.
" See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 274-86 (1972). This treatise
provides an excellent analysis of the utilization of the M'Naghten standard in criminal law cases.
" See Larson, Suicide Defense, supra note 24, at 47; Note, Worker's Compensation-Evolv-
ing Standards for Compensability of Suicide-Kahler v. Plochman, Inc., 55 TEMP. L.Q. 194, 207 n.
105 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Temple Note]. It is pertinent to note that Massachusetts legisla-
tively repealed the Sponatski holding in 1937, adopting a statutory rule of recovery for injury-re-
lated suicides. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 26A (West 1976).
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goals universally propounded as justification for criminal punishment - deter-
rence, retribution, rehabilitation and restraint"'- are thereby served.
Admittedly, responsibility as classically defined is properly the focus in
criminal law, but causation, not intent, should be at the core of each and
every workers' compensation analysis. Since the "knowledge of conse-
quences" prong of Sponatski inevitably leads courts into an analysis of irrele-
vant issues of volition and intention," it is in direct conflict with the public
policy considerations which underlie workers' compensation statutes." The
extraction of a norm from one system of jurisprudence (the criminal law) and
its importation into another system designed to deal with quite different
problems (workers' compensation) is always a behavior fraught with peril-if
not freighted down with the absolute potential for disaster.
The M'Naghten rule, like that of Sponatski, is rooted in an antiquated
model of the mind'" which has long since been rejected by modern psychiatric
science. 8 Courts using the obsolete Sponatski model erringly focus upon cog-
nition,' allowing the term "know" to become the determinative element in
making decisions as to whether or not an award should be granted. Both the
practitioner and his expert certainly understand that "know" refers to cogni-
tion, the faculty of knowing. The Sponatski analysis, by focusing upon the
cognitive faculty of the mind, produces major distortions in the information
held critical to the adjudication of these cases. 8 The flaws inherent in the
Sponatski analysis can be readily ascertained by comparing the inconsistent
results reached by courts applying similar analyses. Benefits have been
awarded to a worker who committed suicide by slitting his throat, 9 but bene-
fits were denied to an employee who waved good-bye to his family before
jumping off a bridge.' Applying Sponatski, the obvious justification for the
43 See, e.g., People v. Burton, 6 Cal.3d 375, 388, 491 P.2d 793, 801, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1971);
People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 781, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445, 402 P.2d 130, 133 (1965); Williams
v. State, 542 P.2d 554, 586 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975), modified, 428 U.S. 907 (1976).
" See infra note 71 for a discussion of public policy considerations which prompted the adop-
tion of workers' compensation statutes. See, e.g., Texas Tech Comment, supra note 9, at 820;
Duke Comment supra note 5, at 622; LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 2, § 2.20, at
5-9.
," See, e.g., Durham v. U.S., 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
46 The antiquated model of Sponatski focuses on cognition which is basic in the two-pronged
M'Naghten test in criminal law. Neuroscientists, psychopharmacologists, psychologists and many
courts, legislatures and scholars have rejected M'Naghten approach in the realm of criminal law.
See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text for detailed discussion of "cognition" and its applica-
tion by courts following the lead of the Massachusetts court in Sponatski.
'7 See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of cognition.
See, e.g., Zimmiski v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 200 Pa. Super. 524, 528, 189 A.2d 897, 900
(1963); Temple Note, supra note 42, at 199.
" Kelly v. Sugarman, 5 A.D.2d 1023, 173 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1958). But see Mershon v. Missouri
Public Service Corp., 359 Mo. 257, 221 S.W.2d 165 (1949).
' Tetrault's Case, 278 Mass. 447, 180 N.E. 231 (1932). See Nohe v. Sheffield Farms Co., 4
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differing results is that in the latter case the employee took the time to give
expression to his "uncontrollable impulse" 1 and therefore must have known
the consequences of his actions.52 Similarly, a court held that benefits should
be denied to an employee who drank lye after developing a serious infection
in the ball of his foot from stepping on a nail at work, merely because the de-
cedent left his wife an explanatory note and waited until she was out of the
house to commit the act.' These courts create a jurisprudential Catch-22: the
claimant's strongest evidence of the existence of an uncontrollable impulse
tends to benefit the employer by implying that the employee had "knowledge
of the consequences" of his act, thereby foreclosing recovery under the latter
portion of the Sponatski test.A
Modern psychiatric insights into the mind reveal the existence of a field
A.D.2d 720, 163 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1957); Speece v. Industrial Comm'n, 46 Ohio Law Abs. 453, 70
N.E.2d 387 (1945); Gasperin v. Consolidation Coal Co., 293 Pa. 589, 143 A. 187 (1928). But see Jung
v. Industrial Comm'n, 242 Wisc. 179, 7 N.W.2d 416 (1943).
51 See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text for an extended discussion of the uncon-
trollable impulse test.
" This rationale is so absurd that it merits only brief explanation. Courts utilizing this mode
of analysis do not deny the existence of an "uncontrollable impulse," but focus upon the
individual's knowledge that he was afflicted with an "uncontrollable impulse" and deny recovery
because the employee knew that he had an "uncontrollable impulse."
I Jones v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 599, 169 S.W.2d 160 (1943). Many courts also
seize upon suicide notes to deny compensation. In essence, these courts characterize the suicidal
act as a rational and volitional act because of the foresight which the decedent supposedly dis-
played by leaving the suicide note. See Widdis v. Collingdale Millwork Co., 169 Pa. Super. 612, 84
A.2d 259 (1951). But see Terminal Shipping Co. v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 915 (D.C. Md. 1965);
Harper v. Industrial Comm'n. 24 fll.2d 103, 180 N.E.2d 480 (1962); In re Sponatski, 220 Mass. 526,
108 N.E. 466 (1915); Kahler v. Plochman, Inc., 85 N.J. 539, 428 A.2d 913 (1981). Conversely, the
nonexistence of a suicide note has been utilized to demonstrate "a lack of premeditation and a
possible irresistable impulse." Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 616, 643, citing in support thereof, Schofield v.
White, 250 Iowa 571, 95 N.W.2d 40 (1959); and Blasczak v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 193 Pa. Super.
422, 165 A.2d 128 (1960). See also Schneidman, Suicide Notes Reconsidered, 36 PSYCH. 379, 380
(1973); Osgood and Walker, Motivation and Language Behavior: A Content Analysis of Suicide
Notes, 59 J. ABNORMAL SOC. PSYCH. 58 (1959).
" Under this fallacious line of reasoning if the individual initially evidences knowledge of his
suicidal impulses by his resistance, but then ultimately resigns himself to death, the courts will
deny recovery unless the claimant selects a bizarre mode of suicide which can be interpreted to
negate "knowledge." For example, compensation was not allowed in the following cases: Kon-
azewski v. Erie R.R., 132 N.J.L. 424, 41 A.2d 130 (1945), affd, 133 N.J.L. 557, 45 A.2d 315 (1946),
overruled sub. nom., Kahler v. Plochman, 85 N.J. 539, 428 A.2d 913 (1981) (Kanazewski court held
no uncontrollable impulse where decedent hanged himself eight weeks after head injury); In-
dustrial Comm'n v. Brubaker, 129 Ohio St. 617, 196 N.E. 409 (1935) (no uncontrollable impulse
found when decedent waited until one week after a hip injury to commit suicide); Kasmen v.
Hillman Coal & Coke Co., 149 Pa. Super. 263, 27 A.2d 762 (1942) (recovery denied because dece-
dent talked to neighbors before walking into a cornfield to shoot himself, even though his actions
were attributable to suffering extreme pain). See LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note
2, at § 36.21.
" See Avery v. City of Middletown, 40 A.D.2d 568, 334 N.Y.S.2d 708 (App. Div. 1972), rev'd,
33 N.Y.2d 771, 305 N.E.2d 492, 350 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1973) (adopting lower court's dissent); Reinstein
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of forces which can best be described as an incredibly complex environment
of interlocking biological computers." The so-called faculty of "knowing," fo-
cused upon by courts utilizing the Sponatski analysis, is only a single function
in a system capable of a very significant number of functions. The human
mind is not dominated by cognition; there is no little cognitive man standing
at the top of the cerebral cortex who is in charge of the multiplicity of
biological computers which comprise our minds.67 From a modern perspec-
tive, the Sponatski analysis appears to be founded upon a nonrational model
of the human mind. This made it possible for the court in Sponatski to speak
of suicide phenomenon "as a voluntary willful choice determined by a
moderately intelligent mental power which knows the purpose and the
physical effect of the suicidal act even though choice is dominated and ruled
by a disordered mind .. ."5 No one who understands modern psychiatric
science - even if his or her understanding is only rudimentary - can reconcile
the Sponatski court's assertion that the suicidal act is a voluntary willful
choice even though the individual is dominated and ruled by a disordered
mind.
II. THE CHAIN OF CAUSATION TEST
A. Generally
The chain of causation test has now been adopted by a majority of juris-
dictions,59 bringing greater fairness and consistency to the adjudication of
v. Nedola, 39 A.D.2d 369, 334 N.Y.S.2d 488 (App. Div. 1972), affd, 33 N.Y.2d 589, 301 N.E.2d 438,
347 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1973); See also A. BECK, DEPRESSION (1976); M. BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE
EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW (2d ed. 1982); N. FARBEROW & E. SCHNEIDMAN, THE CRY FOR HELP
(1965); R. FiEVE, MOODSWING (1976): H. HENDIN, BLACK SUICIDE (1971); J. HILLMAN, SUICIDE AND THE
SOUL (1964); L. KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (1977); R. LIFTON, THE BROKEN CONNECTION
(1979); A. LUDWIG, PRINCIPLES OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (1980); K. MENNINGER, MAN AGAINST
HIMSELF (1938): Berger, Drugs and Suicide in the United States, 8 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 219 (1967).
0 See R. RESTAK, THE BRAIN: THE LAST FRONTIER 52 (1980).
"' Holloway v. U.S., 148 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 852 (1948).
220 Mass. at 530, 108 N.E. at 468.
5 See LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 2, § 36.30 at 6-132. See generally
Findley v. Industrial Comm'n of Ariz., 135 Ariz. 273, 660 P.2d 874 (1983); Reynolds Metals Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 119 Ariz. 566, 582 P.2d 656 (1978); Wood v. Industrial Comm'n of Ariz., 108
Ariz. 50, 492 P.2d 1157 (1972); Rose v. Industrial Comm'n of Arizona, 8 Ariz. App. 182, 444 P.2d
739 (1968); Baxter v. Industrial Comm'n, 6 Ariz. App. 156, 430 P.2d 735 (1967); Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 97 Ariz. 256, 399 P.2d 664 (1965); Donovan v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd.,
138 Cal. App. 3d 323, 187 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1982); Redmon v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 36 Cal.
App. 3d 302, 111 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1973); Beauchamp v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 259 Cal. App. 2d
147, 66 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1968); Burnight v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 786 (1960); Wilder v. Russell Library Co., 107 Conn. 56, 139 A. 644 (1927); Delaware Tire
Center v. Fox, 401 A.2d 97 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979), affd, 411 A.2d 606 (Del. 1980); Jones v. Leon
County Health Dept., 335 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1976); Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So. 2d 464
(Fla. 1949); City of Tampa v. Scott, 397 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. App. 1981); City of Streator v. Industrial
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claims for workers' compensation death benefits when a suicide results from
a psychiatric disorder brought about by a compensable on-the-job injury. Un-
like the Sponatski test, chain of causation analysis ignores such unimportant
factors as the employee's sudden impulse to commit the suicidal act," his
"knowledge of the consequences"81 and the chosen mode of suicide.2 Instead,
it properly focuses on the true issue: The existence or nonexistence of a
direct causal relationship among an on-the-job injury, a subsequent psychia-
tric disorder and the suicide."
Increasing scientific understanding of mental illness has allowed courts
in the late twentieth century to abandon the antiquated M'Naghten rule in
the criminal law context." Likewise, in workers' compensation cases, courts
can now reject the outdated analysis, which of necessity focused upon mani-
festations of suicidal impulses, since internal causal chains can increasingly
be revealed by expert testimony. For instance, the California District Court
of Appeals, faced with a volitional act of suicide by an employee afflicted with
acute psychosis and schizophrenia, could not have revealed the following
level of psychological sophistication in an earlier day:
It is unreasonable and unrealistic to hold that suicide occuring when the em-
ployee is [in a state of psychosis] is not the result of the industrial injury when
the manic depressive state is. If suicide is a result which may be expected
from a manic depressive condition, how can such a result be said to be inten-
tionally self-inflicted, even though the person may know what he is doing and
its results? The manic depressive condition provides the irresistible impulse.
Comm'n, 92 Ill. 2d 353, 442 N.E.2d 497 (Ill. 1982); County of Cook v. Industrial Comm'n, 87 IMI. 2d
204, 429 N.E.2d 865 (1981); Harper v. Industrial Comm'n, 24 Ill. 2d 103, 180 N.E.2d 480 (1962); In re
Fitzgibbons' Case, 374 Mass. 633, 373 N.E.2d 1174 (1978); Lambert's (Dependent's) Case, 364 Mass.
832, 304 N.E.2d 428 (1973); Oberlander's Case, 348 Mass. 1, 200 N.E.2d 268 (1964); Sinclair's Case,
248 Mass. 414, 143 N.E. 330 (1924); Trombley v. Coldwater State Home & Training School, 366
Mich. 649, 115 N.W.2d 561 (1962); Lopucki v. Ford Motor Co., 109 Mich. App. 231, 311 N.W.2d 338
(1981) ("subjective approach" variation); Prentiss Truck & Tractor Co. v. Spencer, 228 Miss. 66, 87
So. 2d 272 (1956); Petty v. Associated Transp., Inc., 276 N.C. 417, 173 S.E.2d 321 (1970); Thompson
v. Lenoir Transfer Co., 48 N.C. App. 47, 268 S.E.2d 534, cert. denied, 301 N.C. 405, 273 S.E.2d 450
(1980); Kahler v. Plochman, 85 N.J. 539, 428 A.2d 913 (1981); Kievsky v. United Neon Supply Corp.,
21 N.J. Misc. 43, 30 A.2d 40 (1942); Saunders v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 526 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.
1975); Brenne v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 38 Wis. 2d 84, 156 N.W.2d 497
(1968). Maryland implicitly approved the chain of causation analysis in Baber v. John C. Knipp &
Sons, 164 Md. 55, 163 A. 862 (1933).
1 See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "uncontrollable im-
pulse" standard.
6, See supra notes 39-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of "knowledge of the conse-
quences" analysis.
1' See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text for an analysis of judicial decisions allowing
benefits merely because a bizarre mode of suicide was chosen.
6 See Clev.-Mar. Note, supra note 7, at 33.
8 See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the M'Naghten rule
cannot be integrated into workers' compensation.
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Mere realization of the nature and effect of the suicidal act cannot be controll-
ing.'
Such an analysis surpasses the simplistic truisms of the Sponatski analysis. 8
Furthermore, as our subsequent discussion will more fully develop,
modern psychiatric theory has revealed that pain, such as that which may re-
sult from an on-the-job injury, can indeed be so intense and unbearable 7 that
suicide is not an altogether irrational option:'
If the sole motivation controlling the will of the employee when he knowingly
decides to kill himself is the pain and despair caused by the injury, and if the
will itself is deranged and disordered by these consequences of the injury,
then it seems wrong to say that this exercise of will is 'independent,' or that it
breaks the chain of causation. Rather, it seems to be the direct line of causa-
tion. 9
Yet, religious and cultural values tend to intrude into this analysis,
stigmatizing suicide as an "inherently evil impulse" despite increasing
awareness of the nature and causes of suicide within the psychiatric com-
munity.70 This may help to explain why some judges, even when armed with
the analytical tools of the chain of causation test, have attempted to
characterize the act of suicide itself as an independent intervening cause.71
I Burnight v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 827-28, 5 Cal. Rptr. 786, 794
(1960). The court also noted that:
Modern psychiatry knows that a manic depressive condition operates to break down
rational mental processes, placing the person afflicted in a mental state in which death
actually seems more attractive than living, and in which he may not only have a con-
scious volition to produce death, but be eager to do so.
Id. at 826, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
See supra notes 18-58 and accompanying text for a discussion for the Sponatski test.
'T See infra notes 93-106 and accompanying text for an evaluation of suicide in psychiatric
terms. See generally Larson, Mental and Nervous Injury in Workmen's Compensation, 23 VAND.
L. REv. 1243 (1970).
" Duke Comment, supra note 5, at 620.
" Burnight v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 181 Cal. App. 2d at 826, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 793 (em-
phasis added).
71 See K.'MENNINGER, MAN AGAINST HIMSELF (1938), and the authorities cited in supra note 7.
71 Compensation was denied in the following cases. Reynolds Metal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n
of Ariz., 119 Ariz. 566, 582 P.2d 656 (1978); Lopez v. Kennecotte Copper Corp., 71 Ariz. 212, 225
P.2d 702 (1950); Vandagriff v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 265 Cal. App. 2d 854, 71 Cal. Rptr. 630
(1968); County of Cook v. Industrial Comm'n, 87 Ill. 2d 204, 429 N.E.2d 865 (1981); Henry v. Schenk
Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 169 Ind. App. 178, 346 N.E.2d 616 (1976); Brown v. American Steel &
Wire Co., 43 Ind. App. 560, 88 N.E. 80 (1909); Soileau v. Travelers Ins. Co., 198 So. 2d 543 (La.
1967); In re Oberlander's Case, 348 Mass. 1, 200 N.E.2d 268 (1964); Konazewska v. Erie R.R. Co., 132
N.J.L. 424, 41 A.2d 130 (1945), affd, 135 N.J.L. 557, 45 A.2d 315 (1945), overruled sub nom., Kahle
v. Plochman, 85 N.J. 539, 428 A.2d 913 (1981); Kazazian v. Segan, 14 N.J. Misc. 78, 182 A. 351
(1936); Hyder v. New York State Dept. of Mental Hygiene, 48 A.D.2d 948, 369 N.Y.S.2d 29 (App.
Div. 1975), affd, 39 N.Y.2d 856, 352 N.E.2d 131, 386 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1976); Frazoni v. Loew's Theatre
Realty Co., 22 A.D.2d 741, 253 N.Y.S.2d 505 (App. Div. 1964); Consula v. Town of Harrison, 16
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A.D.2d 848, 227 N.Y.S.2d 585 (App. Div. 1961); Vernum v. State Univ. of N.Y., 4 A.D.2d 722, 163
N.Y.S.2d 727 (App. Div. 1957); Seal v. Effrom Fuel Oil Co., 284 A.D. 795, 135 N.Y.S.2d 231 (App.
Div. 1954); Palmer v. Redman, 281 A.D. 723, 117 N.Y.S.2d 708 (App. Div. 1952); Joseph v. United
Kimono Co., 194 A.D. 568, 185 N.Y.S. 700 (1921); Babb v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 417 So. 2d 545 (Miss.
1982); Mershon v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Corp., 359 Mo. 257, 221 S.W.2d 165 (1949); Hannon v.
Brandeis & Sons, Inc., 186 Neb. 122, 181 N.W.2d 253 (1970); Industrial Comm'n of Ohio v.
Brubaker, 129 Ohio 617, 196 N.E. 409 (1935); White v. Kitty Clover Co., 409 P.2d 637 (Okla. 1965);
Jones v. Cascade Wood Products, 21 Or. App. 86, 533 P.2d 1399 (1975); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 65 Pa. Commw. 59, 441 A.2d 518 (1982); Westinghouse Electric Corp.
v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 489 Pa. 485, 414 A.2d 625 (1980); Berdy v. Glen Alden Corp., 202
Pa. Super 525, 198 A.2d 329 (1964); Widdis v. Collingdale Millwork Co., 169 Pa. Super. 612, 84 A.2d
259 (1951); Kasman v. Hillman Coal & Coke Co., 149 Pa. Super. 263, 27 A.2d 762 (1942); Shewczuk
v. Conrexeville Mfg. Co., 53 R.I. 223, 165 A. 444 (1933); Mitchem v. Fiske-Carter Constr. Co., 293
S.E.2d 701 (S.C. 1982); Veloz v. Fidelity-Union Cas. Co., 8 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Barber
v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis. 462, 6 N.W.2d 199 (1942); A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n,
264 Wis. 510, 59 N.W.2d 471 (1953).
The inherent difficulties which arise from using such an analysis are apparent. Courts which
apply an independent intervening cause analysis in workers' compensation cases fail to com-
prehend the policy differences between tort concepts and those of workers' compensation. In tort
cases, liability is imposed on the basis of fault, while in workers' compensation liability is imposed as
a humanitarian measure. See LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 2, § 2.20 at 7. Thus,
courts must apply analyses which will properly reflect the underlying policies of these two
divergent areas of the law. In tort law, "proximate cause" analysis is applied in making determina-
tions whether one has breached a duty to another and to establish societal limits on the imposition
of liability. However, in workers' compensation cases, a "but for" analysis should be utilized when
making the ultimate determination of whether a causal chain exists between the original compen-
sable injury, the resulting mental disease or defect, and the subsequent suicidal act. See, e.g., Tuc-
son Rapid Trans. Co. v. Tocci, 3 Ariz. App. 330, 414 P.2d 179 (1966); Barber v. Industrial Comm'n,
241 Wis. 462, 6 N.W.2d 199 (1942) (Judge Fowler, J., dissenting); Wilder v. Russell Library Co.,
107 Conn. 56, 139 A. 644 (1927).
Proximate causation in the negligence context is in many ways a combination of two separate
and distinct concerns: The factual existence of a causal relationship and public policy concerns
about the scope and extent of the individual defendant's liability. Likewise, in the workers' com-
pensation context, the use of the proximate causation concept implies two separate and distinct
concerns: The factual existence of a causal relationship and the public policy concerns which
disfavor suicide. The use of this concept in the workers' compensation context is thus somewhat
suspect, because the public policies disfavoring suicide tend to be a combination of factors, in-
cluding the assumed sanctity of life and a latent fear that a worker might commit suicide in order
to provide financial benefits to his family. Disallowing workers' compensation claims in cases of
suicide does not advance the former concern, and doubtless has little relevance to the latter.
Indeed, it is the existence of the additional required factors in the workers' compensa-
tion-the compensable injury and the development of a mental disease or defect-which
distinguishes the workers' compensation policy considerations from commercial life insurance.
Benefits are properly denied to the insured who has purchased life insurance and then takes his
own life. The simplicity in such a scheme makes the possibilities for fraud obvious. Temple Note,
supra note 42, at 207 n. 109. The workers' compensation claimant, however, cannot so readily
structure the situation. The claimant must sustain an injury in the course of employment and that
injury must be compensable. In addition, he must develop a mental disease or defect and the
suicidal act must be the direct result of the work-related injury.
The New York rule is a modified chain of causation approach. Under this test the claimant is
required to show "genuine brain mental derangement, as distinguished from mere melancholy,
discouragement, or other sane conditions." LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 2, §
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B. Reaction to Theories of Independent Intervening Cause
Judicial distaste for allowing compensation for suicide is strong,72 so it is
not surprising that the independent intervening cause theory arose. Utiliza-
tion of this analysis can operate to deny benefits where an otherwise un-
broken chain of causation exists. Assume, for example, that an employee falls
from a ladder while operating a tire changer.7 The injuries sustained include
a broken arm, severe contusions and disfigurement of the neck, left shoulder
and left eye. The immeasurable pain leaves the employee in a state of "exag-
gerated depression" and unable to return to work." Despondent over his in-
juries and worsening financial situation, the employee takes an overdose of
drugs to end his miserable existence. Although the causal relationship be-
tween the injury, the initial condition and the suicide is obvious, a court em-
ploying the independent intervening cause analysis could deny benefits by as-
serting that an act of suicide inherently breaks the chain of causation.71
Clearly the invocation of this theory involves an a priori assumption by the
court which is neither logically compelled nor supported by established
facts.78
If judicial limits are to be placed upon suicide as a compensable workers'
compensation claim, the boundaries should be established, not through the
use of such sophistry as "independent intervening cause," but by applying
traditional notions of causation.7' An orthodox "but for" analysis of causation
36.30, at 6-137. Many of the cases applying the New York rule would seemingly require actual
evidence of direct physical damage to the brain before allowing recovery. The fallacy of the New
York rule is that it focuses upon outdated concepts of sanity, instead of realities associated with
psychiatric disorders. The only states which currently subscribe to this rule are New York and
Louisiana. Both of these states will probably discard the New York rule in favor of a more ap-
propriate chain of causation test. Evidence to support this conclusion is found in the recent case
McCarville v. Williams, Stevens, McCarville & Frizzell, P.C., 84 A.D.2d 622, 444 N.Y.2d 495
(1981). In MeCarville, the claimant had been an attorney with personal problems who also felt as if
he had made a mistake at work and might be forced to disassociate himself from his law firm.
Compensation was awarded even though no direct physical injury was shown. Such an award is in-
dicative of the chain of causation analysis and not the New York rule.
' The intent of this hypothetical case is to demonstrate the ludicrous result which could oc-
cur when courts utilize the independent intervening cause analysis.
' The facts are taken from Delaware Tire Center v. Fox, 401 A.2d 97 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979),
affd, 411 A.2d 606 (1980), where the court granted compensation.
71 See generally Iowa Comment, supra note 23, at 676-77.
" See LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION supra note 2, § 36.30 at 6-58; Iowa Comment,
supra note 34, 670; Duke Comment, supra note 34, at 619; Larson, Suicide Defense, supra note 24
at 43.
78 In Barber v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis. 462, 467, 6 N.W.2d 199, 202, Judge Fowler in his
dissenting opinion stated that, "[alan intervening cause is one occurring entirely independent of a
prior cause. When a first cause produces a second cause that produces a result, the first cause is
the cause of that result."
" In Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARv. L. R.v. 343, 345 (1915), the distinguished
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would permit a court to utilize its experience and expertise in a nonarbitrary
fashion. Moreover, this approach to causation is congruent with other areas
of law which employ proximate cause as the all-purpose limiting factor,
rather than hypothesizing independent intervening causes.
C. Modern Application of the Chain of Causation Test
The traditional formulation of the chain of causation test was developed
by the Florida Supreme Court in Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co."8 Walter
Whitehead fell from a roof while working and sustained "serious bodily in-
juries,"79 including nerve damage in his foot and shoulder, unbearable pain in
his neck, back and head and paralysis in his arm." Ultimately, Mr. Whitehead
committed suicide and the trial court denied compensation."1 The trial court's
opinion contained elements of the old Sponatski test, including the observa-
tion that at the time of the suicide, the employee's "mental condition was
such that his intention primarily to take his life was wilful."82 The court,
swayed by the policy considerations underpinning the enactment of workers'
compensation statutes," reversed the decision of the trial court and awarded
death benefits despite the volitional act of suicide." The remaining opinion
tracked what is today known as the chain of causation test.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has also given support to
the application of the chain of causation test in workers' compensation cases.
In Hall v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, the employee con-
tracted occupational pneumoconiosis while on the job.' Mr. Hall eventually
developed a chronic lung disease requiring medication and rendering him un-
author opined that "the practices of jurists have often been sounder than their theories have been."
The Florida Supreme Court observed that while suicide is always an intervening act, it is not
always an intervening cause. Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So. 2d 464 (1949); Iowa Com-
ment, supra note 23, at 673 n.17; Temple Note, supra note 42, at 194.
78 43 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1949).
Id. at 464.
Id. at 465.
81 This denial was based upon Florida's statutory bar against awarding benefits for intention-
ally self-inflicted injuries. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09(3) (West 1981). See supra note 11 for discus-
sion of comparable statutory bars in both the state and federal workers' compensation systems.
43 So. 2d at 465.
Legislative relief was originally enacted as a humanitarian measure to provide an effective
means of financial recovery for employees who were injured on the job. Ideally, the system should
function by imposing liability on employers in a manner similar to that imposed upon sellers of
goods under strict products liability theory. See, e.g., Duke Comment, supra note 5, at 622. Tem-
ple Case Note supra note 42, at 195. The financial burden is borne by the employer as a cost of
doing business, but is ultimately passed on to society. The imposition of absolute liability
recognizes that negligence concepts are inapplicable in workers' compensation law.
1 43 So. 2d at 466.
9 303 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1983).
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able to sleep in his bed during the last four years of his life due to his con-
stant fear that he would choke to death.8 The persistent pain caused Mr. Hall
to develop severe anxiety and depression. 7 Expert testimony was introduced
demonstrating that Mr. Hall became physically and emotionally unable to
cope with the constant pain and ultimately shot himself in the head.8 The
West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Commissioner denied benefits, stat-
ing that "Mr. Hall's death was not due to occupational pneumoconiosis, nor
was occupational pneumoconiosis a major contributing factor to his death
.... 8" The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals remanded the case,
adopting and approving the chain of causation analysis." The court deter-
mined that "an employee's suicide which arises in the course of and results
from covered employment is compensable" 1 if:
(1) the employee sustained an injury which itself arose in the course of and re-
sulted from covered employment, and (2) without that injury the employee
would not have developed a mental disorder of such degree as to impair the
employee's normal and rational judgment, and (3) without that mental dis-
order the employee would not have committed suicide.'
III. PSYCHIATRY AND THE CHAIN OF CAUSATION ANALYSIS
The consensus view of modern psychiatric science on suicide is that "[n]o
one evolves so completely as to be entirely free from self-destructive tenden-
cies."8 3 Psychiatrist Martin Blinder has stated that when these "self-destruc-
tive tendencies" existing within the individual are amplified by a work-re-
lated injury, the resulting "[p]ain and suffering ...can be so severe as to
cause or contribute to suicide by the victim."" The psychiatric realities en-
countered in suicide cases can best be understood by considering a vignette
which demonstrates how job-related trauma can produce suicide.
Suppose, for example, that a fifty-five year-old worker in a steel mill falls
approximately five feet while attempting to repair a piece of machinery. As a
86 Brief for Appellant, at 3-4, Hall v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 303 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va.
1983).
8 Id. at 5.
Brief for Appellee, at 1, Hall v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 303 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va.
1983).
303 S.E.2d at 727.
90 Id.
" Id. at 730-31. The court implicitly made a determination that suicide is not a willful act
when the chain of causation analysis is satisfied. See supra note 11 for the pertinent text of the
West Virginia statutory bar against granting compensation for intentional acts.
92 Id.
93M. BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW 179 (2d Ed. 1982). See also
Lasky, Psychiatry and California Worker's Compensation Laws: A Threat and a Challenge, 17
CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 22-24 (1980); A. BECK, H. RESNICK & D. LETTIERI, THE PREDICTION OF SUICIDE
(1974).
"K. MENNINGER, MAN AGAINST HIMSELF 6 (1938).
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direct result of the fall, the employee sustains a ruptured cervical disc and
fractures one vertebrae, resulting in significant cervical instability, soft tis-
sue damage, compression of the spinal cord, severe nerve root compression,
and ligament damage in the cervical area. He experiences constant pain. The
possibility of permanent paralysis requires that surgery be performed. Suc-
cessful stabilization of the spine is accomplished by, surgery, but the injured
employee continues to experience severe headaches and neck pain requiring
the administration of prescription medication. Additionally, the employee is
unable to return to his former employment due to the existence of permanent
neurological damage which would be exacerbated by the performance of his
job related duties. Prior to the fall, the injured employee was an active, op-
timistic, energetic family man who engaged in racquetball and who con-
sidered himself a sports enthusiast. Now, as a direct result of his on-the-job
injury, he is unable to work and is no longer physically capable of par-
ticipating in sports. Depression, melancholia, and pain permeate his very ex-
istence and cause major personality changes to occur. Plagued by fatigue,
anxiety, and feelings of worthlessness, the injured employee suffers from in-
somnia and often becomes irritable. Periodically he weeps uncontrollably.
Furthermore, the employee loses almost all interest in sex, complains about
his inability to concentrate, feels incapable of finishing anything he begins
and frequently sits, staring into space for long periods of time.95 Ultimately,
his self-destructive tendencies are triggered by a psychiatric disorder, and
death l~ecomes an obsession. Almost fourteen months after the original in-
jury, he drafts a suicide note, loads his gun and shoots himself in the head.
Thus, a tragic downward drama results in the demise of a formerly produc-
tive individual.
A. A Technical and Practical Approach for the Psychiatric Expert
The attorney, of course, can observe and delineate the sequence of fac-
tual events which occurred in the vignette. Nevertheless, the presentation of
a good claim or defense will require expert psychiatric analysis,96 for it is the
" The description of the disintegration of this worker's personality is premised on the DIAG-
NOSTIC MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 210-11 (3d ed. 1980), which is published by the American
Psychiatric Association.
Occasionally, a case may arise which seemingly would not require expert testimony to es-
tablish the causal chain of events; however, the practitioner would be ill-advised to proceed
without first consulting an expert. See, e.g., Vernum v. State Univ. of N.Y., 4 A.D.2d 722, 163
N.Y.S.2d 727 (1957) (compensation denied due to claimant's failure to demonstrate a causal link be-
tween the mental illness and the suicide); Palmer v. Redman, 281 A.D. 723, 117 N.YS.2d 708 (App.
Div. 1952). See generally, LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 2 §, 36.50, at 6-144; Lar-
son, Suicide Defense, supra note 24, at 60; Iowa Comment supra note 23, at 672 n.13. In McIntosh
v. E. F. Hauserman Co., 12 A.D.2d 406, 211 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1961), the court was confronted with
conflicting medical testimony, but recovery was allowed because the facts spoke "louder than any
medical testimony as to the insidious breakdown of man's mental and physical capacities." Id. at
409, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 485. See Larson, Suicide Defense, supra note 24, at 60; see also Browning,
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psychiatrist and not the lawyer who can determine if, why and to what ex-
tent, the worker's psychological homeostasis9" was thrown out of systemic
balance by the initial on-the-job injury. In truth, the traumatic injury was a
triggering mechanism which disrupted the employee's vital balance 8 in such
manner that his usual capacity to cope was overcome." In psychiatric terms,
the employee's ego, the mental construct representing all those mental pro-
cesses and systems which allowed him to adjust both to his environment, as
well as the internal realm of his emotions, urges and thoughts, was. substan-
tially impaired."' The trauma resulting from pain, suffering and permanent
occupation loss created symptoms of psychological dysfunction which oper-
ated to dethrone the executive mechanism of his mind-the ego."' The psy-
chiatric dysfunction which was created represented an interaction between
his massive anxiety, the impaired executive mechanism of his mind and his
The Psychiatric Expert, 15 TRIAL 36, 36 (Feb. 1979); Curphey, The Psychological Autopsy: The
Role of the Forensic Pathologist in the Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Death, 1968 BULL.
SUICIDOLOGY 39, 40; Neill, The Psychological Autopsy: A Technique for Investigating a Hospital
Suicide, 25 Hosp. & Comm. PSYCHIATRY 1 (1974); Note, Psychiatric Expert Witnesses: Proposals
for Change, 6 Am. J.L. & MED. 425, 427 (1980); Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness:
Science in the Courtrooms, 38 MD. L. REV. 539 (1979).
Defense attorneys should use experts to establish that the causal chain has been broken, and
also, when the Sponatski test or the New York rule are applied, to demonstrate that the claimant
has not fulfilled his burden of proof. The defense attorney should never forget about the existence
of the statutory bar preventing recovery for volitional or intentional acts. See supra notes 11 and
81 for examples of these statutory bars. A claimant should be denied recovery if the nonvolitional
nature of the decedent's suicidal act is not established by demonstrating a direct causal link bet-
ween the suicide and the mental disease or defect. When that link is made, however, the mental
disease or defect serves to negate intent and removes the statutory bar to recovery.
Additionally, the claimant must demonstrate that the decedent suffered a work-connected in-
jury which sets the chain of causation "in motion." Larson, Suicide Defense, supra note 24, at 57.
Thus, if defense counsel can show that there are "stronger nonemployment influences accounting
for the suicide, the suicide is a complete defense." Id.
' Homeostasis is defined as the "maintenance of relatively stable conditions in a system
(such as blood temperature in the body) by internal processes that counteract any departure from
the normal." OXFORD AMERCIAN DICTIONARY 312 (1980). This term was introduced into medicine by
the eminent psychologist Walter B. Cannon. See H. SELYE, THE STRESS OF LIFE 38 (1956).
, K. MENNINGER, THE VITAL BALANCE 81 (1967).
Id. at 125-52.
'® A more extensive description of the ego can be found in L. KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY 62-64 (1977).
101 Somewhat analogous language is found in Jones v. Leon County Health Dept., 335 So. 2d
269 (Fla. 1976). In Jones, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the denial order of the Industrial
Relations Commission and reinstated the award originally ordered by the claims judge. The Jones
court stated that the decedent's tuberculosis acquired while on the job had "caused him to become
devoid of normal judgment and dominated by disturbance of mind so as to dethrone his reason and
destroy his will so that he was incapable of forming a willful intent to take his life." Id. at 272 (em-
phasis added). The result reached is appropriate, but somewhat lacking in analysis from a modern
psychiatric perspective. The Jones court was correct in asserting that the executive processes of
the *mind (the ego) can be dethroned by occupational trauma, resulting in a situation in which the
individual is "devoid of normal judgment," because the individual is "dominated by disturbance of
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individual personality."2 In essence, it was his self-effort to regain his
psychological homeostasis that precipitated the psychiatric disorder. 113 How-
ever, his efforts proved unsuccessful.
Ultimately, "the only appropriate behavior seem[ed] to be the initiation of
a series of events expected to end in self extermination ... 1.04 At this point,
the ego was virtually dead, pushed to its limit by the surrounding circum-
stances.0 The leading psychiatric expert on the suicide phenomenon, Dr.
Karl Menninger, has described this level of psychiatric dysfunction in the fol-
lowing manner:
When the virtually unquenchable spark of life flickers out in despair, when all
hope, need, and effort give way to futility, when the only release seems to be
the ending of all further struggle then a Fifth Order of disintegration has been
reached and death by one's own hand often follows."
B. A Practical Approach for the Attorney
The hypothetical vignette presented a worker who, prior to his injury,
had made a reasonable and culturally appropriate adjustment to life. He
worked at a skilled job, had a normal attachment to his family and enjoyed
sports as a participant and observer. He had established a positive personal
identity and secured a place for himself as a productive actor in an economic
role. He then suffered a severe blow to his very existence-the injury. His
"usual" self, which was defined through reference to personal and occupa-
tional existence, was severely undercut. He could not do and be as before. In
a very real sense the injury was a catastrophic rupture of his lifeline. In truth
"he" (the self) psychologically no longer existed. His "vital balance" was so
severely disturbed that he became the victim of a depressive illness which
completely changed his personality and resulted in the destruction of his
life.'
mind." Id. Nonetheless, the Jones court erringly utilized terms like "reason" and "will" reminis-
cent of the M'Naghten rule of criminal law. See supra notes 40-58 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the conceptual differences between the application of M'Naghten in criminal law and
workers' compensation law.
"I For an examination of the psychiatric development of an individual over an entire lifespan,
see E. ERICKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (1968); E. ERICKSON, IDENTITY: USE AND CRISIS (1968); E.
ERICKSON, DIMENSIONS OF A NEW IDENTITY (1974).
"13 See supra note 97 for a discussion of homeostasis. A similar situation exists when military
personnel suffer combat-induced disorders. See Note, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder-Opening
Pandora's Box 17 NEW ENG. 91 (1981). A master work analyzing the impact of trauma upon an en-
tire community and its individual inhabitant's has also been written. See K. ERICKSON, EVERY-
THING IN ITS PATH: DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN THE BUFFALO CREEK FLOOD (1976).
10, K. MENNINGER, THE VITAL BALANCE 265 (1967).
105 Id.
101 Id.
'0 The injured employee's psychiatric disorder is properly designated "post-traumatic de-
pression." See M. BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW (2d ed. 1982).
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Undoubtedly, his injury "arose out of and in the cause of employment,"" 8
and triggered a psychiatric disorder ultimately resulting in suicide. The vig-
nette introduced no other possible causes for the psychiatric disorder. None-
theless, the defense attorney, whenever possible, must attempt to break the
causal chain by presenting expert psychiatric testimony of other disruptions
to the employee's homeostasis."' In the vignette, the employee's vital balance
was disrupted by the physical and psychic aftermath of the injury. The first
cause (the injury) gave rise to the second cause (the psychiatric disorder),
causing extreme manifestations of dysfunction. This psychiatric dysfunction
limited the employee's normal capacity to cope with pain and left only self-de-
struction as a means of relief. Thus, the suicide was the product of the psy-
chiatric disorder and, but for the original injury, the psychiatric disorder
would not have existed.
Application of the chain of causation test would allow recovery in this
case, where the strict application of the Sponatski test, because of its inher-
ent deficiencies may have precluded an award of benefits."'0
CONCLUSION
The unsettled nature of this area of workers' compensation law demon-
strates the need for more consistency in adjudications of this type. It is our
position that courts should adopt the chain of causation test. Adoption of the
chain of causation analysis would provide a clear, consistent rule of law which
exploits judicial expertise and provides compensation in appropriate cases.
The chain of causation test as enunciated by the West Virginia Supreme
Court in Hall v. State Workmens' Compensation Comm'r. is the only rule
which stands in accord with the findings of modern psychiatry and the
underlying policies of worker's compensation statutes. It utilizes modern
psychiatric science to achieve substantial justice. Thus, it is essential that
those who, of necessity, participate in the adjudication of workers' compensa-
tion cases of this nature familiarize themselves not only with decisions such
as Hall, but also with the principles of modern psychiatric science.
' LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION supra note 2, § 36.40, at 6-139.
10 In the appropriate case, the attorney may wish to use a suicidologist. "A suicidologist is
one who receives training in the determination of suicide and devotes a significant portion of his
work to dealing with the diagnosis, prevention, or analyzation of suicidal tendencies." Widmann,
The Use of a Suicidologist In Accidental Death Litigation, 47 INS. COUNSEL J. 219, 219 (1980). See
also Note, Psychological Autopsy: A New Tool for CriminalDefense Attorneys? 24 ARIZ. L, REV.
421, 426 (1982) (allows an expert in human behavior to draw a psychological picture of a dead per-
son whom the expert has never met).
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